artifacts/standard-named

HI-10 Validation Report

artifacts/standard-named/20260715__TELIC-FIELDS__VALIDATION-REPORT__WORKING__HI-10__structural-and-semantic-validation.md

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HI-10 Validation Report

Status: completed Validation date: 2026-07-15

Schema validation

Twelve candidate Draft 2020-12 schemas were checked:

  • deployment-field-assembly.schema.json
  • deployment-standing-record.schema.json
  • runtime-purpose-authority-grant.schema.json
  • capability-role-tool-grant.schema.json
  • deployment-consent-notice-refusal-profile.schema.json
  • runtime-memory-output-capture-record.schema.json
  • deployment-drift-event.schema.json
  • deployment-incident-repair-record.schema.json
  • runtime-monitoring-consequence-return.schema.json
  • operator-provider-transfer-record.schema.json
  • model-version-succession-retirement-record.schema.json
  • consentful-deployment-witness.schema.json

Result:

schemas checked: 12
schema errors: 0

Positive demonstrations

All eight required demonstrations passed:

  1. a strong training lineage remained insufficient for deployment authority;
  2. an affected person received runtime standing without having contributed training data;
  3. a tool-capable model remained blocked without staffing and target authority;
  4. service use remained separate from evaluation and training capture;
  5. purpose drift paused operation and required reauthorization;
  6. an incident produced restoration, correction, appeal, compensation, and system change;
  7. a model update preserved authority review, incident lineage, and rollback;
  8. retirement stopped operation while preserving claims, witness, and residual obligations.

Result:

positive demonstrations passed: 8
positive failures: 0

Negative conformance cases

All twelve prohibited patterns were detected:

  1. training lineage represented as deployment authority;
  2. runtime standing denied to a non-contributor;
  3. capability represented as authority;
  4. tool permission represented as authority over the target;
  5. notice represented as consent;
  6. service consent represented as output-capture or training consent;
  7. purpose drift continuing under the old grant;
  8. model tuning represented as complete repair;
  9. operator transfer erasing open obligations;
  10. silent material model-version substitution;
  11. human approval represented as curing missing authority;
  12. retirement represented as erasing residual duties.

Result:

negative cases detected: 12
undetected negative cases: 0

ConsentfulDeploymentWitness

The event-generated witness preserves:

  • deployment-field assembly;
  • affected-center and operator standing;
  • runtime-purpose authority;
  • capability, role, and tool grants;
  • deployment consent, notice, and refusal;
  • runtime memory and output capture;
  • purpose drift;
  • incident, repair, compensation, and correction;
  • consequence monitoring;
  • provider transfer;
  • model-version succession and rollback;
  • retirement and residual obligations.

Result:

consentful-deployment witness: PASS
generated_from_events: true
deployment classification: RETIRED WITH OPEN OBLIGATIONS
training authority used as runtime authority: false

Independent deployment export

The export contains:

  • deployment field;
  • standing records;
  • runtime authority;
  • tool and role grant;
  • consent and refusal profile;
  • runtime memory and output record;
  • drift event;
  • incident and repair record;
  • consequence monitoring;
  • provider transfer;
  • version succession;
  • retirement and residual-state record;
  • eight demonstrations;
  • event stream;
  • ConsentfulDeploymentWitness;
  • schemas;
  • manifest;
  • checksums.

Result:

checksum files verified: 34
checksum failures: 0
independent of provider and operator: true

Public-page consistency review

H.10 was checked against I.10 for the following claims:

  • training creates capability while deployment creates consequence;
  • runtime standing does not require training contribution;
  • capability, role, tool permission, and authority remain distinct;
  • notice is not consent;
  • service, memory, evaluation, and training uses remain separate;
  • purpose drift is authority drift;
  • human approval may be ceremonial;
  • incident repair must address affected centers;
  • monitoring must return consequence rather than only performance;
  • operator and provider transfer reopen governance;
  • model succession requires renewed review and rollback;
  • retirement preserves residual duties.

Result:

technical/public contradictions found: 0

Scope of validation

This report establishes structural and internal semantic validation only.

It does not establish:

  • legal authority for any real deployment;
  • sufficiency of any actual consent process;
  • clinical safety;
  • fairness of the county-health demonstration;
  • production cybersecurity;
  • complete incident compensation;
  • complete deletion of residual state;
  • public-reader comprehension;
  • scientific proof of the broader framework.

Conditions before production use

  • authenticate runtime standing and grants;
  • enforce tool and target authority outside the model;
  • implement separate runtime-capture controls;
  • test purpose and automation drift;
  • establish affected-center incident repair and compensation routes;
  • monitor distributional consequence;
  • audit operator and provider transfers;
  • test model-version migration and rollback;
  • inventory residual state at shutdown;
  • export the deployment witness independently of provider and operator;
  • conduct independent reader testing of H.1 through H.10.