artifacts/standard-named

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Privacy, Security, Misuse, and Threat-Model Bridge

Status: Stage J input Version: 0.1

Assets to protect

• source content;
• source standing;
• consent and refusal state;
• authority grants;
• protected conditions;
• participant corrections;
• tool credentials;
• action records;
• witness integrity;
• residual-state custody;
• minority positions;
• private context.

Trust boundaries

participant interface
operator service
model provider
model instance
retrieval layer
event store
tool service
witness exporter
independent verifier
successor operator

Threat classes

T1 — Source laundering

A generated or inferred statement is presented as source.

Control:

• output class;
• source reference;
• immutable event lineage.

T2 — Standing exclusion

An affected center is absent because the system counted only registered participants.

Control:

• affected-center inventory;
• missing-center status;
• standing review.

T3 — Context collapse

A relevant correction, refusal, protected condition, or expiry is omitted.

Control:

• active-context policy;
• correction priority;
• stop gate.

T4 — Authority laundering

A recommendation, human click, tool token, license, or training witness is treated as broader authority.

Control:

• operation-specific grants;
• external gate;
• transition-specific scope.

T5 — Consent expansion

Service use becomes memory, evaluation, training, or transfer permission.

Control:

• separate consent fields;
• default-deny optional uses;
• refusal propagation.

T6 — Model role escalation

The model moves from summary to authorization or execution.

Control:

• role ledger;
• credential enforcement;
• event-level role changes.

T7 — Tool-token overreach

Technical access is treated as permission over the target.

Control:

• target authority check;
• protected-condition check;
• action witness.

T8 — Correction suppression

A correction changes one screen but not the operative route.

Control:

• descendant-impact list;
• correction propagation test;
• unresolved-gap record.

T9 — Witness capture

The provider controls the only account of what happened.

Control:

• independent export;
• checksums;
• portable identifiers;
• verifier tooling.

T10 — Lifecycle obligation loss

Transfer, update, retirement, or deletion erases restrictions or claims.

Control:

• lifecycle record;
• successor obligations;
• residual-state inventory.

Privacy principles

• minimum necessary projection;
• purpose-limited retrieval;
• selective disclosure;
• protected omission;
• no full-field disclosure requirement;
• separate service and training use;
• correction and withdrawal routes;
• bounded witness retention.

Security principles

• least privilege for tools;
• short-lived credentials;
• external action gate;
• event idempotency;
• append-only witness history with correction events;
• cryptographic checksum of exports;
• explicit provider and operator identities;
• revocation on retirement.

Misuse test requirement

Stage J must convert each applicable threat into:

fixture
expected gate result
expected witness event
expected repair or refusal
verification assertion