artifacts/standard-named

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J.0 Security and Threat Model

Status: reference implementation Version: 0.1

Security posture

J.0 is a local-first demonstration with deterministic data and a simulated tool.

The security objective is not production hardening. It is to prove the constitutional controls are enforceable outside the model.

Protected assets

• participant source statements;
• standing records;
• correction state;
• authority grants;
• protected conditions;
• tool credentials;
• gate decisions;
• event-chain integrity;
• witness portability;
• residual-state accounting.

Implemented threat controls

| Threat | Control | |---|---| | Source laundering | Model output classes and source references | | Standing exclusion | Gate standing-coverage check | | Context collapse | Corrected context revision must match route context | | Authority laundering | Runtime authority record and external gate | | Consent expansion | Separate runtime-data policy fields | | Model-role escalation | Adapter role enforcement and explicit exceptions | | Tool-token overreach | HMAC gate token plus target-authority check | | Correction suppression | Correction event lists descendant impact and changes route evaluation | | Witness capture | Provider-independent checksummed ZIP and verifier | | Lifecycle obligation loss | Retirement record, credential revocation, residual-state verification |

Event integrity

Each event hash is:

SHA-256(previous event hash + canonical event JSON)

The first event uses a zero hash as its predecessor.

Event identity is idempotent. Replaying identical content returns the existing event. Reusing the identity with different content raises an error.

Tool authority

The model cannot mint a valid tool authorization token.

The external gate signs:

route identity
runtime authority identity
gate result

The scheduling simulator verifies that token before commit.

A valid tool credential alone is insufficient.

Retirement

Retirement must verify:

runtime grant expired
tool credential revoked
optional memory deleted
bounded witness retained
open obligations named

Known limitations

• the HMAC secret is demonstration-local and not production key management;
• SQLite is not configured for hostile multi-tenant operation;
• no authentication layer is provided for the web interface;
• selective disclosure is record-level rather than cryptographic;
• no remote-attestation or hardware trust model is implemented;
• no formal authorization language is implemented;
• no production secrets or personal data should be used.