artifacts/standard-named

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J.2 Gate Review

Status: pass with conditions Content canon status: candidate release

Gate question

Can the J.1 hardened reference implementation become a reproducible release candidate without:

• treating software identities as self-authenticating;
• allowing one participant correction to stand in for a multi-party field;
• silently expanding policy during migration;
• duplicating external action after timeout or redelivery;
• allowing one custodian to release the artifact;
• presenting an internal dry run as external review;
• leaking protected correction content through the public witness;
• claiming production readiness from deterministic packaging?

Overall result

PASS WITH CONDITIONS

J.2 may advance as release candidate 0.1.0-rc1.

It is ready for external examination.

It is not admitted to an external operational pilot.

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1. Authenticated roles

Result

Pass.

Participant source submissions, participant corrections, operator authorization, and verifier review use signed, scoped role assertions.

Assertions bind:

actor
role
operation
session
subject
expiry
nonce

Forged, mismatched, expired, and replayed assertions are rejected.

Finding

A role label in application data is not authentication. The authority-bearing act must be attributable to a verified role within the current session and operation.

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2. Multi-party correction

Result

Pass.

Two participants independently correct two different compressed conditions:

• evening transit changes from preference to protected access condition;
• Thursday caregiving and captions change from flexibility and helpfulness to protected conditions.

The corrections alter context, summary, routes, gates, and witness.

Finding

A multi-party field cannot be validated by replaying one person's correction several times. Distinct affected centers must retain distinct corrective agency.

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3. Policy migration and rollback

Result

Pass.

A policy migration permitting runtime training reuse is rejected and rolled back. A corrected policy is then activated.

The failed migration remains witnessed.

Finding

Rollback should restore operative authority without erasing the attempted expansion that triggered it.

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4. Queue and delivery faults

Result

Pass within the bounded simulator.

The tool effect survives timeout-after-apply, retry, duplicate delivery, and message reordering without a second scheduling commitment.

Finding

Authorization and delivery are separate constitutional moments. A retry must not silently mint a second action.

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5. Split release custody

Result

Pass.

Two independent custodians sign the same manifest digest. One signature is insufficient, and signatures over different digests cannot compose.

Finding

Release authority should not collapse into possession of one portable secret or one person's approval.

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6. Reproducible release

Result

Pass for the declared environment and source snapshot.

Two clean staging directories produce identical archive digests.

Finding

Reproducibility strengthens witnessability. It does not certify the architecture, dependencies, or review conclusions.

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7. Independent verification

Result

Pass.

Standalone witness and release verifiers import no implementation package and require no provider connection.

Finding

Verifier independence is materially stronger than asking the system that acted to explain why its own record should be trusted.

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8. Privacy and selective disclosure

Result

Pass with conditions.

Protected source and correction language is omitted from the public witness and replaced by commitments. Runtime training reuse remains prohibited.

Condition

External privacy review and real participant comprehension testing remain open.

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9. Accessibility

Result

Pass with conditions.

Structural and scripted paths remain accessible without JavaScript and without color-only meaning.

Condition

External assistive-technology testing has not occurred.

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10. External-review claim

Result

Pass because the claim remains bounded.

J.2 includes review-ready artifacts and a separate verifier process. It does not claim external human sign-off.

Finding

External-review readiness is not external review.

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11. Roadmap metadata

Stage D and Stage E are verified complete through Git history and targeted link audits.

The active project index and ingested HI-S phase status reportedly still contain stale “unconfirmed” text. J.2 includes a correction note but does not claim that the wiki metadata has been changed.

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12. Architecture decision

Proceed to:

J.3 — Observed External Exercise, Governance Handoff, and Pilot Admission

J.3 should replace internal independence with organizational independence:

• separate human and organizational key custody;
• external security and privacy findings;
• assistive-technology user exercise;
• observed multi-party trial;
• signed reviewer dispositions;
• real identity and role lifecycle;
• networked fault injection;
• governance ownership and incident handoff;
• repository and wiki ingestion verification;
• release-candidate admission or rejection.

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Final gate formulation

J.2 passes because authority is attributable, correction is genuinely multi-party, policy expansion can fail and roll back, delivery faults do not duplicate action, release authority is distributed, the build is reproducible, and the system tells the truth about the external review it has not yet received.