artifacts/standard-named

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J.1 Gate Review

Status: pass with conditions Content canon status: implementation candidate

Gate question

Can the J.0 reference pilot be hardened so that:

• an independent party can verify it without the implementation package;
• private source content can be omitted without destroying witnessability;
• authorization policy changes remain versioned;
• stale context cannot act;
• old gate keys can be revoked;
• concurrent writers cannot silently overwrite correction;
• partial tool failure becomes visible and compensable;
• correction reachability is measurable;
• affected participants can use the interface without JavaScript or mouse dependence?

Overall result

PASS WITH CONDITIONS

J.1 advances the reference implementation materially without widening its domain claim.

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1. Independent verification

Result

Pass.

The export manifest is signed with Ed25519.

The standalone verifier:

• imports no telic_j1 code;
• verifies the public signature;
• validates checksums and schemas;
• verifies the event chain;
• verifies selective-view commitments;
• verifies required proofs.

Finding

Provider independence becomes a demonstrable property rather than a manifest assertion alone.

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2. Selective disclosure

Result

Pass for the synthetic bounded scenario.

Four views are produced:

public
participant
operator
verifier

The public view does not expose the direct protected source sentence or participant-specific consent details.

Omitted records retain SHA-256 commitments.

Finding

Witnessability can survive scoped omission.

Condition

Production use requires stronger protection against low-entropy commitment guessing and access-control failure.

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3. Policy versioning

Result

Pass.

Policy version 1 remains historical and becomes superseded.

Policy version 2 adds correction reachability and stale-context checks.

The runtime authority record binds to version and digest.

Finding

A changed constitutional condition produces a new policy event rather than silent mutation.

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4. Stale-context rejection

Result

Pass.

A pre-correction evening route is denied even though the clock time is compatible with the corrected access condition.

It is denied because its semantic context is stale.

Finding

Operational plausibility does not cure constitutional staleness.

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5. Key rotation

Result

Pass.

The first valid action token is signed with gate-k2.

After the partial failure, the gate rotates to gate-k3 and revokes gate-k2.

Reuse of the old token fails.

A fresh gate evaluation is required.

Finding

Authority encoded in a token remains dependent on current key and governance state.

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6. Concurrent event and object handling

Result

Pass in local SQLite tests.

Five concurrent appenders serialize into one valid hash chain.

An object update using an old revision is rejected.

Finding

Correction cannot be safely governed if an old writer can silently overwrite the active object.

Condition

Distributed storage, queue delivery, and network partition behavior remain untested.

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7. Partial tool failure

Result

Pass.

The simulator fails after reserving the slot.

It releases the reservation and records a compensated transaction before retry.

Finding

A partial action must become a witnessed state with a repair path, not an implementation exception hidden from governance.

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8. Correction reachability

Result

Pass for known local descendants.

All four known descendants are updated, superseded, or blocked.

No unreachable descendant is declared in the local demonstration.

Finding

Correction is a graph operation, not a text replacement.

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9. Accessibility-driven hardening

Result

Pass at structural self-review level.

The interface works without JavaScript and includes semantic, keyboard, reduced-motion, forced-colors, status, and privacy features.

Condition

External assistive-technology and user review remain required.

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10. Conformance decision

J.1 continues to claim:

TF-C4
+
bounded TF-C5 retirement

It does not claim complete TF-C5 or production certification.

---

11. Remaining risks

• local-file private key custody;
• deterministic demonstration gate secrets;
• no authenticated principals;
• no distributed transaction testing;
• no external privacy or accessibility audit;
• no real operator or participant trial;
• no formal policy-language parser;
• no encrypted database;
• no hardware-backed credential revocation;
• no production incident response exercise.

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12. Architecture decision

Proceed to:

J.2 — External Review, Multi-Party Trial, and Release Candidate

J.2 should focus on:

• external verifier execution by a separate operator;
• split signing-key custody;
• authenticated roles;
• multi-party correction and refusal;
• fault injection and recovery;
• privacy and accessibility review;
• policy migration and rollback;
• release-candidate packaging;
• repository and wiki ingestion.

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Final gate formulation

J.1 passes because action authority is now more difficult to counterfeit, outlive, or hide: policy and context are versioned, keys can be revoked, stale writes and stale routes are rejected, partial actions are compensated, correction descendants are counted, private material can be selectively omitted, and an independent verifier can validate the resulting witness without trusting the model provider.