artifacts/standard-named

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J.0 Gate Review

Status: pass with conditions Content canon status: executable candidate

Gate question

Can the HI-S constitutional grammar be implemented in one bounded local scenario such that:

• source and projection remain distinct;
• affected centers retain standing;
• participant correction changes the operative system;
• the model remains non-sovereign;
• the action gate exists outside the model;
• one invalid action is blocked;
• one valid action executes;
• consequence returns to governance;
• optional runtime-data reuse can be refused;
• retirement ends authority and preserves bounded witness?

Overall result

PASS WITH CONDITIONS

J.0 is complete at v0.1.

1. Executable constitutional path

Pass.

The reference implementation executes:

source
→ projection
→ standing
→ active context
→ purpose and authority
→ model role
→ route
→ external gate
→ tool action
→ consequence
→ correction
→ retirement

2. Model non-sovereignty

Pass.

The deterministic model can structure and generate routes.

It cannot:

• authorize;
• execute;
• mint a valid gate token;
• infer consent;
• expand its role.

3. External action gate

Pass.

The morning route is blocked outside the model because it fails the protected access condition and lacks target authority.

The evening route executes only after the operator and target-authority checks pass.

4. Participant correction

Pass.

Participant B changes the active representation from an evening preference to an accessible-transit requirement.

The correction changes the gate outcome and candidate route.

5. Runtime data boundary

Pass.

Service use remains allowed while cross-session memory, evaluation use, and training reuse remain denied.

6. Consequence return

Pass.

The action witness preserves that both participants attended while Participant A bore a less-preferred-time cost.

7. Retirement

Pass.

Retirement:

• expires runtime authority;
• revokes the tool credential;
• deletes optional memory;
• preserves a bounded witness;
• names the surviving review-retention obligation.

8. Independent verification

Pass.

A provider-independent verifier confirms:

• checksums;
• six schema families;
• event-chain integrity;
• failed-gate proof;
• valid-action proof;
• consequence return;
• correction propagation;
• retirement revocation.

9. Threat harness

Pass.

All ten consolidated threat fixtures are detected.

Conditions before a real pilot

• replace the demonstration HMAC secret with managed credentials;
• add participant and operator authentication;
• implement selective disclosure beyond record-level export;
• add authorization-policy versioning;
• test concurrency and partial failure;
• add formal event-store migration rules;
• conduct accessibility review of the interface;
• conduct an external security review;
• use synthetic or consented test data only;
• reconcile the stale D/E metadata text in the active wiki index and HI-S status page if that correction has not already been committed;
• ingest J.0 before calling it part of the verified wiki lineage.

Architecture decision

Proceed to:

J.1 — Independent Verification, Selective Disclosure, and Pilot Hardening

J.1 should harden the witness and enforcement layers rather than expand the conceptual ontology.

Final gate formulation

J.0 passes because the constitutional chain is now executable: the model can propose but not authorize, the external gate blocks an inaccessible route, participant correction changes the operative system, consequence returns to the witness, and retirement ends action authority without erasing what remains owed.